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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
PETER ANDRE LEVIN, Case No. 15644 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, PETER ANDRE LEVIN, appeals from decisions 
rendered in two legal proceedings and consolidates his arguments 
in both matters herein. First, the verdict of guilty rendered 
in the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to an Information 
charging the appellant with Unlawful Possession of a Stolen Motor 
Vehicle, a Third Degree Felony, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr., Judge, presiding. Second, from an order denying his release 
from the Utah State Prison upon a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On January 4, 1977, the appellant, Peter Andre Levin, was 
found guilty by the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., a judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court, of the crime of Unlawful Possession 
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of a Stolen Motor Vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-ll: 
(1953 as amended). On January 20, 19~8, appellant was sentenced 
to the indeterminate term as provided by law to the Utah State 
Prison. 
On April 4, 1978, appellant, Peter Andre Levin, filed a 
complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judi. 
District alleging that his committment to the Utah State Prisoil ii 
invalid. The matter was set for hearing before the Honorable Peti 
Leary and was denied on June 22, 1978. 
The appellant has filed a motion to consolidate the appei 
from both these proceedings as the issues involved are the same. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, Peter Andre Levin, seeks an order from th: 
court remanding the matter to the Third Judicial District for re· 
sentencing pursuant to a directive that sentencing in this matter 
cannot exceed six months in the County Jail and a fine of $299.~~ 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 2, 1977, Stephanie Hancock drove her familY 
stationwagon and parked at West High School in Salt Lake CitY· 
ked sh1 1 A few hours later, upon returning to where the car was par ' 
found it missing. . securit' 1 On November 4, 1977, John Mcintire, a · 
" h . d that he.: I 
agent for Sears was contacted by a "Mr. Bates w o sai 
1 th car•: with a person at that time whom he believed had sto en e 
- 2 -
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they were using. Mr. Mcintire called the police. Before they were 
able to arrive, he walked out of the store to see the automobile. 
He was about 40 feet from the car when he observed "Mr. Bates" get 
into the passenger seat and another person enter into the driver's 
seat and drive away. When asked if this person, who was the driver, 
was the appellant, he stated that he could not positively make that 
identification. 
Brent Ellcock, a police officer with Salt Lake City, 
testified that on November 4, 1977, about 6:30 p.m. he was contacted 
by a Bryan Bates. Mr. Bates directed him to an area in front of 
the Pal-D-Mar Bowling Alley in downtown Salt Lake City. Upon arriving 
at that location he observed a stationwagon. The officer returned 
to the police station where he' observed the appellant talking to 
i: the desk sergeant. Officer Ellcock directed Officer Ray Dowling to 
remain with the car and for the desk sergeant to inform him when the 
appellant left the police station. Officer Ellcock returned to the 
car after Officer Dowling had arrested the appellant at the scene. 
Officer Ray Dowling testified that after he had been 
instructed by Officer Ellcock to disable the vehicle pictured in 
State's Exhibit I and II, he maintained a position where he could 
observe the car. After ten minutes the appellant approached the 
10
' car and entered the driver's seat. Moments later, Officer Dowling 
approached the car and opened the driver's door where he observed 
.,, the appellant drop a screwdriver. 
•• Officer Ellcock then arrived and informed the appellant 
- 3 -
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that he was under arrest for Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. 
Officer Ellcock transported ~he appellant to jail. In 
route the appellant made a statement wherein he said he didn't knr 
why they were arresting him and didn't know the vehicle was stoler 
In further statements, the appellant said that he didn't know the 
person's full name that he was with but that it was that person 
who had stolen the car. Having been found guilty, the court 
sentenced the appellant to a term in the Utah State Prison not to 
exceed five years. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE 
APPELLANT'S CONDUCT, BEING PROSCRIBED UNDER TWO PRO-
VISIONS OF LAW ENTITLED HIM TO BE SENTENCED UNDER THE 
PROVISION WITH THE LESSER PENALTY. 
The appellant was sentenced pursuant to Title 41, Chapt~ I 
1, Section 112, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Appendix A) which is 
a Third Degree Felony punishable by not more than five years ini 
Utah State Prison and a fine not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars 
Upon conviction a motion was made to sentence under the n 
provisions of Title 41, Chapter l, Section 109, Utah Code Annotal 
1953 (Appendix A) the penalty for which is a Class B Misdemeanor c 
Both statutes, given the facts of the case, proscribed the same 
conduct and because the appellant is entitled to be sentenced uni 
ld have t the provision which imposes the lesser penalty, he shou 
sentenced to a Class B Misdemeanor. 
- 4 -
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There have been three decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
which address this issue. State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), 
nr State v. Fair, 456 P.2d 168 (1969), Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 
er 1108 (1977). The rule of law arising from these decisions is 
e that where there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct 
but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled to the 
lesser. 
In this case the violator was accused of being in possession 
of an automobile which he knew had either been stolen or unlawfully 
taken. Such conduct is proscribed by the concluding provisions of 
Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 112, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This 
statute has further language which proscribes other more specific 
acts but would not apply to this case. Therefore it is only the 
concluding clause that has application. That clause requires that 
e: the violator be in possession of the automobile with knowledge that 
the car was stolen or improperly taken. 
The evidence of possession in this case was the Sears 
security agent who testified that he saw a person driving the auto-
1 mobile away from the store, but could not positively identify him 
as the appellant and Officer Dowling also saw the appellant in the 
driver's seat while the car was at rest, with a screwdriver in his 
hand. The implication being that he was attempting to start that 
1i automobile. 
The second element is that the violator must know that 
:he car was improperly taken. The importance here is that there 
- 5 -
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need not be a showing that the car was "stolen". A joy riding 
episode is an improper taking, though short of a theft, and woul: 
qualify as an element under this statute. 
The evidence presented to this element of knowledge besi: 
the inference of possession was testimony of Officer Ellcock, whc 
remembers two statements by the appellant after he was arrested. 
One was to the effect that appellant did not know why he was 
arrested and did not know the car had been stolen. Later he stat' 
that another person had stolen the car, but disavowed any connect: 
with that taking. 
Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 109 is the misdemeanor co111: 
known as the joy riding statute. The elements of this offense a:i 
that the violator drive an automobile which has been improperly t 
His intention, however, would only be to temporarily deprive the 
owner and not to steal the car. 
Putting the two statutes in this case side by side it 
becomes obvious that there are differences, but given the facts 
this case, they do not apply. 
The elements of "possession" or "drives" is not qualita: 
different and the appellant was not seen performing any greater 
action in relation to the automobile than driving or sitting in: 
driver's seat. 
Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 112 requires that he have 
knowledge of the car being "stolen or improperly taken". The sc 
makes no distinction between the two and does not require that' 
- 6 -
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violator be the person who took the automobile. There is no re-
quirement to show that the car was stolen, only that it was "unlaw-
fully taken" and the State's evidence in this case neither attempted 
nor achieved any distinction. 
Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 109 also requires that the 
violator have knowledge that the automobile was taken unlawfully. 
Such knowledge is implied when it is shown that the car was .taken 
without the owner's consent. 
In Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (1977), this Court 
compared, pursuant to the same issue as is raised in this case, two 
statutes which prohibited obtaining drugs. Title 58, Chapter 37, 
Section 8(4)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a felony, prohibited 
a person from acquiring possession of a controlled substance by 
forgery. Title 58, Chapter 17, Section 14.13, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, a misdemeanor, prohibited obtaining a substance which was 
designated as unsafe by fraud. 
The distinction between these two statutes was recognized 
as two fold. First, one statute dealt with controlled substances 
and was specific and the other statute dealt with all unsafe drugs 
and was general. The defendant had obtained a controlled substance, 
Preludin, which is a controlled substance specifically prohibited. 
Secondly, the legislature expressly drew a distinction by specifying 
that conflicts were to be controlled by the provisions of the felony 
statute. Such a directive was geared to conflicts in the drug and 
Pharmacy laws. 
No such distinctions can be applied to the laws involved 
and facts presented in evidence in this case. As written and as 
- 7 -
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applied, both statutes prohibit the same conduct. Neither is more 
general or specific and there is no legislative preference which 
has been expressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant is entitled to the lesser penalty if it cat! 
be shown that his conduct is prohibited under two statutes one of i 
which has a lesser penalty. 
I The appellant was prosecuted under the provisions of I 
Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 112, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, whictl 
I 
is a Third Degree Felony. Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 109, U~ 
Code Annotated, 1953, by its terms and in light of the appellant'! 
conduct proved at trial makes it a statute identical to the felon:/ 
provision. However, because Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 109 is:I 
Class B Misdemeanor the appellant was entitled to that lesser pen1 
and the Court erred by not sentencing in that manner. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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